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ABSTRACT
Team incentives are important in many compensation systems that pay workers according to the
output of their team as well as to their own output, with team bonuses often depending on
whether the team meets or exceeds specified thresholds. Yet little is known about how team
members with different abilities respond to compensation rules and thresholds. We contrast the
performance of lower ability participants and higher ability participants in an experiment with
three distribution schemes – equal sharing, piece rate sharing, and tournament style winner-takesall – in settings with and without a team threshold. Workers randomly assigned to equal sharing
had higher productivity than those assigned to winner-takes-all and had similar productivity to
workers in piece-rate scheme. Output under equal sharing was boosted by the higher productivity
of less able workers, possibly motivated by a desire to avoid guilt feelings about letting down
their partners, per models of guilt aversion. Given a choice of distribution schemes, participants
selected piece rate over equal sharing and favored both of these over winner-takes-all; in addition,
a team threshold induced more concern about cooperation and thus greater preference for equal
sharing. The findings suggest that organizations with teams of workers with varying abilities are
likely to do better if the organization can consider lower ability workers’ responsiveness to
sharing in rewards, e.g., to have an equal sharing component in its compensation system when
they are strongly guilt averse.
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1. Introduction
An increasing proportion of firms organize production around self-managed teams
of workers (Porter and Beyerlein, 2000; Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Irlenbusch and
Ruchala, 2008). 1 Yet relatively little is known about how team members with different
abilities respond to compensation rules and team thresholds or about worker
preferences regarding the way the firm divides team earnings among workers (Charness
and Kuhn, 2011).
This study reports the results of an experiment in which team members work on
independent tasks with an identifiable individual contribution but where part of their
pay is associated with team production. While the notion of team-based pay with a
production technology in which workers produce independently may seem odd, such
practices are widespread, vide cashiers (Mas and Moretti 2009), fruit pickers (Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2013) or garment factory workers (Hamilton, Nickerson, and
Owan, 2003). In a similar vein, many firms try to spur individuals in a group to perform
better by rewarding the group if it exceeds a specified team output threshold. Ledford
et al. (1995) document the wide variety of such team pay incentives.
Our experiment is based on participants performing the slider task, a real effort
activity that requires an individual to move a slider into the exact middle position on a
computer screen in a specified period. 2 Success in the task demands ability and effort
(Gill and Prowse, 2012) but not special knowledge or prowess. Individuals in our
experiment perform the task independently. Thus, the team relation comes entirely from
relating part of pay to team output.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the experiment. The experiment begins with a
benchmark stage in which individuals perform the slider task for piece rate pay. We
take their performance at this stage as an indicator of individual ability at the task. We
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Lazear and Shaw (2007) report that the share of large firms with workers in self-managed teams rose
from 27% in 1987 to 78% in 1996.
2
Some studies suggest that workers’ output observed in slider task is not very elastic to monetary
incentives (see Araujo et al., 2016). Gill and Prowse (2019) suggest that real-effort tasks in general
tend to produce small responses to between-subject variation in positive piece-rate incentives and
show that within-subject designs lead to greater effects (see page 6 in their paper). We differ from
these studies in that we have a fixed piece-rate across our treatments, but we investigate whether
workers’ output responds to various team sharing schemes. Moreover, we have a benchmark stage
to measure heterogeneous abilities in the real-effort task that are well controlled for in our regression
analyses. We have the same subject over multiple stages and the same team with potentially varying
team sharing schemes, both of which echo Gill and Prowse’ appeal for real-effort tasks with “repeated observations of effort provision from the same subjects in a short time frame.”
1

form teams by pairing two randomly selected participants together and make individual
earnings depend on group as well as individual output. We identify the person with
lower (or higher) benchmark output on each team as the less (or more) able person on
that team.
The experiment then proceeds in three stages. In Stage 1 we randomly assign one
of three distribution schemes to each team: equal sharing, piece-rate, and a tournament
style winner-takes-all. We further randomly assign the teams into a productivity
threshold condition in which team members are compensated only if team output
reaches or exceeds a specified threshold or a no-threshold condition, in which
individuals are compensated by the given system of pay with no specified threshold.
We then have participants perform the slider task.

In Stage 2, team members chat

about the experiment and decide whether to continue with their randomly assigned
distribution scheme or to switch to a different scheme. To gain insight into how
participants think about this decision we recorded the chats. In Stage 3 the teams work
on the slider task under the distribution scheme they chose in Stage 2.
We find that:
(1) Teams randomly assigned to equal sharing outperformed teams randomly
assigned to winner-takes-all by sizeable amounts and outperformed teams randomly
assigned piece-rate by smaller and statistically insignificant amounts. Workers initially
assigned to equal sharing in Stage 1 also outperformed others in Stage 3 where teams
operate under their chosen distribution scheme.
(2) The better performance of equal sharing was due to lower ability persons,
who produced more under equal sharing than in piece rate or winner-takes-all. Higher
ability persons in equal sharing did not contribute differently than those from the other
sharing schemes.
(3) The majority of participants favored piece-rate, possibly because this was a
natural group norm under a technology in which workers worked independently.
(4) Given the option of changing the distribution scheme, nearly all participants
abandoned the least productive winner-takes-all scheme, with the majority choosing
piece-rate compensation but with some preferring equal sharing.
(5) Imposing a team threshold induced greater discussion about the need to
cooperate in chatting messages and moved their preferences toward equal sharing,
although most still preferred the piece-rate norm.
2

We use Charness and Dufwenberg's (2006) guilt-aversion model to explain the
sizable positive response of lower ability workers to equal sharing. This model predicts
that under specified conditions less productive workers will work extra hard to avoid
feeling guilt by letting down more able members of a group.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that simultaneously studies
a group output threshold and various distribution schemes. For instance, Nalbantian and
Schotter's (1997) also studied group threshold, but they did not study how it varies
across different distribution schemes. The present study has three key contributions to
the literature. First, our anonymous and random assignment of workers to teams and to
incentive schemes as well as the independent nature of the slider task eliminate any
personal ties in the group, thus allowing us to identify the effectiveness of team
incentive on both the lower and higher ability workers’ productivities without other
confounding factors. By contrast, most related studies often either focus on productivity
sorting (Dohmen and Falk, 2011) and the role of higher ability workers (Bandiera et al.,
2013; Cooper, Saral, and Villeval, 2021; Hamilton et al., 2003), or attribute the
productivity increase of low-ability workers to social incentives such as friendship
(Mas and Moretti, 2009) or working with a friend who are more able (Bandiera et al.,
2010), and peer pressure under close monitoring of each other with known identity
(Mas and Moretti, 2009) or peers that work face to face (Falk and Ichino, 2006). 3
Second, our measurement and control of individual’s ability and report of teammate’s
productivity allow us to isolate peer effect and to identify the pure effects of distribution
scheme. Specifically, our results rule out peer effects as the explanation for differences
in productivity across incentive schemes but are instead consistent with a guilt aversion
theory. Third, teammates’ discussion after randomized matching production and selfselection into their preferred distribution scheme allows us to examine both workers’
individual preference and the aggregate social norm toward the distribution scheme.
Section 2 provides more detailed comparisons between our study and the literature.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 places the slider experiment in the
context of experiments linking worker output to incentives. Section 3 details our
experimental protocol. Section 4 gives the main results. Section 5 gives the guilt
aversion explanation of the results. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A displays the
instructions we gave to participants and a screenshot of how the experiment appeared
3

Mas and Moretti (2009) found no productivity gain if mutual monitoring is absent.
3

on their computer. Appendix B presents additional results of Stage 3 of the experiment
in which participants operated by their chosen mode of compensation. Appendix C
presents our version of the theoretical guilt-aversion model focused on the increased
output of the less able under equal sharing.

2. Related Experimental Literature
Our experiment builds on Nalbantian and Schotter's (1997) analysis of a targetbased scheme in which a team shares output equally for exceeding a team threshold and
Knez and Simester's (2001) analysis of Continental Airline’s incentive program which
gave employees the same monthly bonus for achieving a firm-wide performance target.
We go beyond these studies by: contrasting the output effects of equal sharing with the
output effects of piece rate pay and of winner-takes-all tournament pay; comparing
compensation systems with and without a team target; and allowing teams to choose
the distribution scheme in Stage 3.
Our focus on lower ability workers differs from the focus of most studies
regarding incentives and team production on productivity sorting and the contribution
of higher ability workers. In their analysis of high performing workers, Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul (2013) found that between-team tournament induces high abilities
to form teams with other high ability workers and boosts average team output by
spurring teams with top ability. 4 Dohmen and Falk (2011) showed that participants
opting for a variable payment scheme of their choice (piece-rate, tournament, or
revenue-sharing) has higher outputs than those choosing a fixed payment scheme,
mainly due to productivity sorting; they also found multidimensional sorting in terms
of gender, risk attitude, and relative self-assessment. Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan
(2003) reported that a group piece-rate incentive that shared the group reward equally
attracted higher ability workers to join teams first and induced higher productivity than
individual piece-rate production; many high skill workers forgo some earnings by doing
so, suggesting nonpecuniary benefit of teamwork. Cooper, Saral, and Villeval (2021)
look at a difference aspect and study when more able workers are willing to join teams
with lower ability coworkers and find that they are more willing to do so if there is no
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Sorting is also popular under individual-based production and payment. For example, Lazear (2000)
found that compared to hourly wage, piece-rate raises average productivity partly by attracting higher
ability workers.
4

within-team revenue sharing and if they can communicate and enjoy the expected future
monetary beneficial from teaching their teammates.
Analyses concerned with lower ability workers attribute their productivity
levels to social factors such as working with friends, mutually monitoring the efforts of
each other, or peer pressures rather than as responses to distribution incentives.
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010) reported that even under independent production
technology and individual piece rate payment system, workers are more productive
when they work with friends with higher abilities than when they do not have friends
among coworkers. 5 Falk and Ichino (2006) focused on peer effects in explaining the
lower ability workers’ increased productivity while we focused on different team
incentives. Mas and Moretti (2009) found that when cashiers are within eyesight,
slower performers seek to reduce productivity differentials with their faster peers rather
than free ride.
Our experiment differs from these studies by randomly assigning participants
into incentive schemes that operate with or without a threshold. Random assignment
isolates the incentive effect on productivity from selectivity and maintains anonymity
among team members so that changes in production cannot be attributed to friendship
or expected future interactions. In addition, in all our experiments, lower ability team
members observe the efforts of higher ability teammates and vice versa, which rules
out peer effects as explaining differences in productivity across distribution schemes.
Turning to thresholds, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) studied total productivity
improvement where the gains are shared among team members; while Sutter (2005)
studied a joint effort provision scheme where workers share in gains if the group reaches
a threshold target but gain nothing if the group fails to reach the threshold. Our threshold
resembles Sutter's as we pay teams that reach or exceed a threshold and give no payoff
to teams that fall below the threshold. Again, we differ from earlier studies in that we
randomly assign the threshold condition to teams and allow for different distribution
rules.

3. Experiment Design

5

They also found that workers are significantly less productive when they work with friends who are less
able than them, even under piece rate, foregoing upwards of 10% of their earnings.
5

We conducted the experiment at Zhejiang University, China. We recruited 248
undergraduates from several majors and organized them into sessions that contained all
three distribution schemes. We computerized the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). In the experiment, participants work on real-effort slider tasks (Gill and Prowse
2012) in which participants face a computer screen displaying 48 sliders, each on a
scale from 0 to 100. Initially, all sliders are positioned at zero. The participant uses the
mouse to move as many sliders as they can to exactly the middle point 50 on the scale
in the allocated time. The task is easy to understand and do with no scope for guessing.
We use participants’ benchmark performance to indicate their ability at the task.
Our experiment has equal, piece-rate, and winner-takes-all distribution
schemes, each with a Threshold and a No Threshold design. We recruited 150
participants in the Threshold condition, and randomly assigned them to a distribution
scheme, each with 50 participants. We had 98 participants in the No Threshold
condition (34 in equal, 34 in piece-rate, and 30 in winner-takes-all). Each session
averaged about 30 minutes, beginning with five minutes of instructions, followed by a
two-minute practice.
The experiment followed the Figure 1 flow chart. We paid each participant in
the benchmark stage a piece rate of 0.30 RMB for each slider-bar moved to the middle
point. This allowed us and the participants to determine the relative ability of persons
when we randomly formed a team. To incentivize persons to do their best without
gaming future stages of the experiment (per Charness, Kuhn and Villeval (2011)’s
rachet effect), we told them that there would be future stages but not the details of these
stages and that earnings in each stage was independent of earnings in other stages.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Moving to the team component of the experiment, we randomly joined two
participants into a team and randomly assigned the team to equal, piece-rate or winnertakes-all and to the Threshold or No Threshold condition. We told team members the
scores of their teammate so they could assess relative abilities at the slider task. Each
team had four minutes to slide as many bars as they could. During the task, they
observed in real time their and their teammate’s performances; therefore, they got
relative performance feedback (Eriksson et al., 2009). After finishing the task, we paid

them their compensation. Those in the No Threshold condition received half the total
tokens earned by the team under equal, their individual contribution proportional to
6

total team tokens under piece-rate, and either all or none of the tokens in winner-takesall. Those in the Threshold condition received the payment only if their team reached
or exceeded the threshold target but received nothing if the team fell short of the
threshold. 6 The difference between receiving the payment or receiving nothing made
the Threshold/No Threshold condition a potentially powerful determinant of outcomes
and driver of team members' preference for a distribution scheme in Stage 2. The
Threshold condition created a big incentive for a team to perform well. If the team
exceeded the threshold the two members would share the compensation for the group
output according to the distribution scheme. But if the team fell short, members would
earn nothing in the session. We gave 51 teams a threshold equal to the sum of the two
participants’ piece rate outputs in the benchmark stage and gave 24 teams 1.1 times the
team output. As the participants did not know how we would choose thresholds, the
experiment avoided any strategic gaming in the benchmark stage.
We began the next part of the experiment by informing participants of the
average Stage 1 performance of teams under each distribution scheme – information
that they could use to assess whether they/their team might profit from choosing a
different distribution scheme. We gave them four minutes in the chat box of Ztree to
discuss their preferences. If team members agreed to switch to the same new
distribution, the pair made the switch. If they did not agree, the distribution scheme
stayed as it was. We recorded the discussion and coded up whether the team discussed
cooperation, fairness, the originally randomly assigned scheme, and differences in their
abilities. In Stage 3, the teams performed the slider task for four minutes under the
distribution scheme they had chosen. Participants earned, on average, around 43.6
RMB during the experiment (including a 10 RMB show-up fee) 7. We asked participants
who had been in the Threshold condition to about whether they had individual output
goals.

4.

Experimental Findings

4.1 The Power of Equal Sharing
Figure 2 depicts the team outputs in the Stage 1 experiment by the distribution
scheme and by Threshold/No Threshold condition. It shows that equal sharing yields

6
7

They still receive their earnings from benchmark stage and their show-up fee.
Their earnings were around the typical student wage rate of 50 RMB per hour, approximately 7 US$.
7

the highest output, piece rate comes second in output, while winner-takes-all comes in
last. Team output under equal is statistically significantly higher than output in winnertakes-all 8 and insignificantly higher than in piece-rate. 9 Indicative of the greater success of equal sharing in the Threshold condition, 72% of the groups in equal sharing
reached the threshold, compared to 64% of the groups in piece-rate and 56% of the
groups in winner-takes-all.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Table 1 records coefficients and standard errors for a linear regression of the
Stage 1 output of each participant on the participants’ benchmark output, dummy
variables for the mode of distribution of team output, and for whether the Threshold
condition held. Columns (1) and (2) give results for the entire sample of participants
while Columns (3) and (4) separate the results for those who scored lower and higher
in their team in the benchmark stage.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The estimated coefficients on the benchmark output are significantly positive in
all four columns, supporting the notion that benchmark performance captured
individual ability differences in doing the task. The estimated coefficients on equal are
significantly positive in columns 1 and 2, relative to the default winner-takes-all group
(p < 0.05) and exceed those on piece-rate (though not significantly, p > 0.1, Wald test).
This confirms the Figure 1 summary that equal was more productive than winner-takesall and a bit more productive than piece-rate as well. The estimated coefficients on the
Threshold condition dummy variable are positive but statistically insignificant. 10
The most striking result in Table 1 is the difference in estimates between the
column (3) regression for lower ability participants and the column (4) regression for
higher ability participants. For lower ability persons, equal sharing has a substantial
advantage over the default winner-takes-all and twice the estimated effect of piece-rate.
By contrast, for higher ability persons the regression shows no difference in the
estimated coefficients of modes of compensation. This implies that the high output in
equal sharing is due to the higher performance of the lower ability workers.

8

No Threshold: 88.7 vs 76.6, p = 0.02; Threshold: 83 vs 78.1, p = 0.36, two-sided Mann-Whitney test.
No Threshold: 88.7 vs 86.6, p = 0.70; Threshold: 83 vs. 81.6, p = 0.87, two-sided Mann-Whitney test.
10
Regressions (available upon request) with two threshold dummies (1.0 and 1.1 times) yield similar
results.
8
9

4.2 Chats and Choices for Distribution Schemes
4.2.1 Choices for Distribution Schemes
Stage 2 allowed teammates to change their distribution scheme from the
randomly assigned scheme. Table 2 shows that many teams took advantage of this
opportunity. 11 The rows record the initial distribution of teams among equal, piece-rate,
and winner-takes-all. The columns give the number and proportion of the destinations.
The matrix elements display the shifts. Panel A, which combines the Threshold and No
Threshold conditions, shows that all but two teams initially assigned winner-takes-all
abandoned it, with most shifting to piece rate pay. Nearly 2/3rds of the teams under
equal sharing shifted to piece-rate, while 1/7th shifted from piece-rate to equal. Piecerate pay was the only form in which the majority of members (86%) chose to stay,
making it the “attractor” distribution in the experiment. Panel B and Panel C show that
this pattern holds for the No Threshold and Threshold conditions taken separately. Yet,
compared to No threshold, more teams chose equal-sharing, partly because more of
those originally assigned to equal-sharing in Threshold chose to stay with it.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
How can we best interpret the choices displayed in Table 2?
That participants shun winner-takes-all makes sense as it had the lowest
economic payoff. But with equal sharing having a modestly higher return than piecerate, the preference for piece-rate must be due something beyond choosing the most
lucrative option. One possibility is that the independent production in the sliding bar
task and the real-time feedback of each other’s output created the preference for piecerate as a fair social norm. 12 Another is that piece-rate reflects a compromise between
the more productive who have an incentive to choose winner-takes-all and the less
productive who have an incentive to choose equal sharing. 13

11

12

Among all 124 teams, 117 of them (or 94.4%) reached unanimity regarding the distribution method for Stage 3.

In six group chats, workers consider piece-rate as fairest while equal sharing (winner-takes-all) unfair
for the higher-ability (lower-ability). See motivation category E in Appendix Table D1. Our results are
consistent with one treatment in Breza et al. (2018): when workers can clearly perceive the productivity
gap among peers, pay disparity is considered as fair in the sense that it does not harm workers’ output,
attendance, or group cooperation. Bolton and Werner (2016) have similar findings in an artificial laboratory principal–agent gift exchange experiment: lower productivity agents accept the principal’s explanation for their lower pay with full transparency about agents’ productivity differences, suggesting that
workers believe in a fairness norm with their earnings linked to individual productivities. Participants in
the study of Fehr et al. (2021) perceive piece rate schemes as fairer than tournaments.
13
In three group chats, the higher-ability explicitly persuades the lower-ability to choose piece rate as a
safer/better choice for the latter than the (previously assigned) winner-takes-all scheme. See motivation
category G in Appendix Table D1.
9

To get greater insight into these possible explanations, we turn to the choice of
equal sharing compared to the most favored piece-rate norm and to winner-takes-all.
We regressed a dummy variable that equals to “1” if individuals choose equal sharing
and “0” otherwise on independent variables for the attributes of the person, a dummy
variable for being the low ability person on a team, and a dummy variable for the
Threshold condition, as well as on the teams’ randomly assigned distribution scheme.
Economic logic suggests that the lower ability persons should favor equal more
than higher ability persons and that the team threshold will increase the preference for
equal to the extent that equal is associated with higher output. We test these
expectations in Column 1 in table 3. The estimated regression coefficients show that
lower ability participants were more likely to favor equal sharing, 14 that workers paid
piece rate were less likely to choose equal sharing than those initially assigned winnertakes-all or equal sharing, and that workers in the threshold condition were more likely
to choose equal sharing.
[Insert Table 3 here]

4.2.2 Understanding Distribution Choices through Chat Messages
We examine next the chat discussions between team members’ about changing
the mode of distribution. We had three research assistants independently review the
chat messages and code whether any of the following terms/concepts appeared in the
conversations: a) Cooperation; b) The within-team gap in productivity; c) The Stage 1
original distribution schemes; d) Fairness. The RAs coded the chats in a consistent way
that implies they captured the concepts in the discussion. 15
Table 4 shows the prevalence of the four concepts in the chats. The most
discussed issue in both Threshold and No Threshold experiments was the gap in
benchmark ability. Modest proportions of discussions concerned the previously
assigned distribution scheme and fairness. The most striking difference in discussions
in the table is between the Threshold and No Threshold experiments: 24 of 75 (27%) of
14

The chat messages also show consistent evidence. In eight group chats, the higher-ability (lowerability) workers explicitly express preferences for piece-rate (equal sharing) from the perspective of selfinterest. See motivation category D in Appendix Table D1.
15
The raters agreed unanimously from 75% to 90% of the time. The Kappa (κ) measure of an inter-rater
reliability shows that the raters agreed significantly more than by chance: “Cooperation”: κ= 0.46, Z=8.9,
p <0.001; “Gap”: κ =0.83, Z=16.1, p < 0.001; “Original assignment”: κ =0.57, Z=10.9, p < 0.001;
“Fairness”: κ =0.65, Z=12.5, p < 0.001. We apply the majority rule when the coders disagreed.

10

teams in the Threshold condition discussed the importance of cooperation compared to
just 2 of 49 (4%) of teams in the No Threshold condition. We interpret this as reflecting
the impact of the extreme Threshold monetary incentive on the participants’ views of
themselves as constituting a team. 16
[Insert Table 4 Here]
To see whether chatting about cooperation impacted the preference for equal
sharing compensation, we turn back to Table 3 and add a chat-cooperation dummy
variable in column (2) to the regression of preferences on the attributes of teams. The
estimate shows that the chat discussion dummy significantly increases the preference
for equal sharing while reducing the coefficient of the Threshold condition. The
implication is that much of the effect of threshold on favoring equal sharing occurs by
its inducing participants to talk about the need for members to cooperate in working
hard to reach the target. By contrast, measures of the other themes in the chat had little
impact on the importance of chatting about cooperation nor on the coefficient of the
Threshold condition. One possible dynamic is that the threshold allowed lower ability
participants to bargain for equal sharing due to the higher ability participant’s need for
their effort to attain the threshold level. 17
Besides the above analyses, we also resort to the detailed chat messages to gauge
the motivations for choosing different distribution schemes and summarize them in
Appendix D.

4.2.3 Some Evidence of Teaching from Higher to Lower Ability
Besides discussing distribution schemes, the chatting stage also provided opportunities
for team members to communicate the know-how of the slider task. Indeed, we find in
11 groups the higher ability explicitly taught the lower ability how to perform better. 18
We summarize the teaching pattern in motivation category B in Appendix Table D1.
Within these 11 groups, almost all of them (10 groups) came from the group threshold
16

This is reflected in their stage two choice, where 35% (Table 2, Panel C) of teams ended up choosing
equal sharing in Threshold while only 16% (Table 2, Panel B) did so in No Threshold.
17
In the chat messages, the higher-ability workers in 10 groups express that they would choose equal
sharing due to altruism or cooperation. Among these 10 groups, the Threshold condition accounts for 90%
(i.e., 9 groups), a much higher ratio than the overall ratio of groups with Threshold in our total samples.
See motivation category C in Appendix Table D1.
18
There may be two reasons why most groups did not take such a chance. First, they only had four
minutes to chat and vote for distribution schemes and we did not explicitly encourage them to discuss
the technique. Second, most participants may think there is no much to teach and learn because the slider
task demands “no special knowledge or prowess” (Gill and Prowse, 2012).
11

condition. Put it differently, teaching occurred in 13.3% of groups (or 10 out of 75
groups) in the threshold condition but only in 2.0% of groups (or 1 out of 49 groups) in
the No-threshold condition, suggesting that the need to reach the group threshold boosts
the higher ability’s incentive to teach. This pattern echoes Sandvik et al. (2020) who
find that knowledge providers are more willing to share information when their own
interests are linked to partners’ joint out as well as Cooper, Saral, and Villeval (2021)
where high ability workers are more likely to teach when there is expected future
monetary beneficial from teaching (see their Result 7). However, among the 11 groups
with teaching, the ratio that finally chose piece rate rather than equal sharing for Stage
3 is as high as 82% (i.e., 9 out of 11), even higher than the overall ratio of 71% choosing
piece rate among all 124 groups in our sample and the ratio of 63% among all groups
in the threshold condition. This may suggest that the higher ability workers consider
teaching as a favor to the lower ability and an effort to help meet the group threshold,
and would not further compromise. That is, they employ teaching as an alternative to
choosing equal sharing of maintaining group cohesion and morale, without conceding
their pay share. This pattern is consistent with Cooper, Saral, and Villeval (2021): most
higher ability workers choose not to join a team if they have to share revenues with
coworkers (see the treatments other than PR in their Table 2).

4.3 Equal Sharing in Stage 1 Has Sustained Impacts in Stage 3
Stage 3 of the experiment had participants perform the slider task with the distribution
scheme they chose in Stage 2. Column (1) of Table 5 records the results of regressing
the outcomes of individuals in Stage 3 on their performance in the benchmark, whether
they were in a Threshold or No Threshold condition and on the mode of compensation.
It shows that equal sharing in the initial random assignment was associated with higher
outcomes in the third stage just as in the first stage. Columns (2) and (3) show further
that the driving force for the higher outcomes is again the better performance of the
lower ability participants under equal sharing. This raises the possibility (not envisaged
in our initial experimental design) that a person’s early experience of a compensation
system (or any other aspect of work) may affect their productivity in later work
situations. 19

19

To analyze this would require a more complex experimental design with longitudinal data on
productivity as workers move from workplace to workplace, and a larger data set than ours.
12

[Inert Table 5 Here]

4.4 The Effect of the Threshold
Our experiment used the Threshold condition to strengthen the team link
between members by making their pay depend on the output of their teammate as well
as their own output. We chose the sum of the two team members’ benchmark scores
and 1.10 times this sum as the thresholds on the notion that both were outside the reach
of only one person but could be attained by team if both members made sufficient effort.
Indeed, 69% of the teams with the sum of benchmark scores as threshold attained it,
compared to 54% of teams that had the more difficult threshold of 10% above the sum.
The teams that fell short, moreover, come close to the thresholds with average team
productivity to be 97.6% out of the relevant threshold. In short, participants seem to
have found the thresholds sufficiently attainable to try to reach it but still difficult
enough that a fair number failed.
To get insight into the thinking of participants in a Threshold setting, we asked:
“How much of the team threshold did you target?” The question allowed for four
answers: “less than half, equal to half, more than half, and I have not thought about this
at all.” Figure 3 shows that two-thirds or more of the higher ability participants reported
that they targeted more than half of the threshold in all the distribution systems (77%
in winner-takes-all, 82% in equal, and 67% in piece-rate) with the rest having no target
or targeting half of the threshold. By contrast, much smaller proportions of lower ability
participants said they targeted more than half (27% in winner-takes-all, 27% in equal,
and 38% in piece-rate), while a large proportion said they never thought about a
personal target for the team threshold.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Finally, continuing our focus on lower ability persons, we examined whether
the minority of lower ability persons who targeted over half of the threshold (for reasons
of self-confidence or guilt aversion) outperformed other lower ability team members.
We regressed the Stage 1 outputs on dummy variables for whether individuals aimed to
take more than half, half, or less than half of the target output in Table 6. The column
(1) regression shows for the threshold group that lower ability team members who
aimed for more than half of the group target had significantly higher output than those
with no target (p < 0.05) and those who targeted less than half and exactly at half (Wald
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test:p < 0.001 and p = 0.005, respectively), with those who had no target outperforming
those who targeted less than one half . 20 As no higher ability participant targeted less
than half of the threshold, the column (2) regression for the higher ability group
contrasts those who reported targeting more than half of the threshold with those who
targeted a half or who had no target at all. These estimates show no clear pattern for the
higher ability group, with the output of those who targeted over a half not differing
much from those who targeted a half nor from those who had no target. As a check on
these patterns, we expanded the sample to include persons in the No Threshold
experiment, assigning them as persons without an individual target. The results in
columns (3) confirm the finding that targeting affect low ability persons but had no
clear results on high ability persons in this expanded and slightly modified analysis.
[Insert Table 6 Here]

5. A Guilt Aversion Explanation
5.l The Conceptual Framework and Evidence of Guilt Aversion
We propose an explanation of the performance of less able workers in a team setting
based on guilt aversion using the model given in Appendix C, which builds on Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006). Our variant of the guilt-aversion model assumes a technology
of work that reflects the sliding bar task in which each person’s output depends solely
on their ability and effort. We posit that this production process generates a social norm
that individual earnings should be proportionate to individual output and that in a team
setting with equal sharing this norm impels lower ability persons to try to raise their
productivity to avoid being the weak link that produces team failure. 21 The intuition is
similar to the formal model in Gill and Stone (2015) that agents who exert less effort
feel they deserve less than an equal share, and so are motivated to try to match the
higher efforts of their teammates; but we emphasize the disutility from letting down the
partner rather than earning more than oneself deserves.
There is evidence in our data for a “piece rate” norm. Queried after the experiment
about attitudes toward compensation, 60% of our sample said they rated piece-rate as
the most popular distribution scheme compared to less than a quarter considering equal

20

When we define lower ability as those who has lower productivity in both benchmark stage and Stage
one, the result becomes stronger (available upon request).
21
Ye et al. (2020) provided a recent survey on methods to promote weak link coordination and examined
gradualism (slowly increasing the stake of group project) as one such mechanism.
14

as the most popular. In the Stage 2 experiment in which teams could switch distribution
schemes large majorities chose piece rate: 85% of persons in the No Threshold
experiments choose piece-rate while 64% of persons in the Threshold condition also
did so. We attribute the lower percentage choosing piece rate in the Threshold
condition as reflecting the fact that the Threshold requires both participants to produce
substantially to gain the reward, which should weaken a pure piece rate norm.
We also have some direct evidence of guilt aversion from the chat messages. In
twenty-four group chats, the lower-ability workers explicitly express they would feel
guilty from letting down the partner. Thus, they prefer piece rate to equal sharing, or
they would work harder should equal sharing be chosen. See motivation category A in
Appendix Table D1.

5.2 More Able Participants and Other Group Interactions
Since team output depends on the effort of higher ability participants as well as
that of lower ability participants, our results require that higher ability participants do
not slack to offset the additional output of lower ability participants. If the more able
considered equal sharing unfair because they earn less than they would have under
piece-rate 22 and responded by producing less in equal sharing than in piece-rate, this
could have readily counterbalanced the impact of guilt aversion in raising the output of
the less able on team output. If, by contrast, equal sharing spurred the production of
more able team members as it spurred the production of less able team members, the
output of both would increase, enhancing the attraction of equal sharing. 23 Indeed, Chen
and Lim (2013) report such behavior in their experiment when the team members knew
each other and put out greater effort in team contests than in individual contests. 24 They
attributed this to guilt aversion of both team members to letting their team down.

22

Gill and Stone (2015) call this desert loss and provide a theoretical analysis that allows desert loss,
desert guilt (similar to guilt aversion in our case), and desert elation.
23
In our experiment, guilt aversion under equal sharing can also come from higher ability participants
if they feel guilty from not performing their best to benefit the lower ability partner even more. Although
this aspect is beyond our formal conceptual analysis, chat messages do suggest that in three teams (all in
the Threshold condition), not only the lower ability but also the higher one considers equal sharing a
powerful team incentive to spur both of their productivity. See motivation category F in Appendix Table
D1.
24
In the context of charitable giving, Charness and Holder (2019) show that because of guilt aversion to
“let down their team” participants donate more in team competition than in individual competition for
matching funds even under anonymity.
15

Similarly, Babcock et al. (2015) found big productivity increases in team incentives
compared to an individual incentive and they attribute this to guilt or social pressure.

5.3 The Peer Effect Explanation?
Other forms of group interaction might also influence the behavior of more and
less able members of a team in ways that go beyond our analysis. Peer pressure (e.g.,
Mas and Moretti 2009) and reference dependence (Abeler et al., 2011; Gill and Prowse,
2012) models predict that behavior depends on interactions among teammates. Some
persons randomly teamed with a better performer might respond by trying harder.
Some others might free ride. Given that free-riding tends to increase with group size,
we expect peer influence to spur greater effort in our two-person experiment, with lower
ability workers exerting more effort as they observe their better performing teammates
or faced pressure from the better performers regardless of the distribution scheme rather
than with equal sharing but no other reward schemes. To assess whether peer
pressure/reference dependence affects participants’ behavior in the slider experiment,
we added a variable for the benchmark score of the individuals’ teammate to our Table
1 regressions of Stage 1 output on independent variables and to the comparable Table
5 regressions of Stage 3 output.
Table 7 summarizes the statistical results. Being randomly paired with a higher
ability person raises the performance of lower ability workers in both Stage 1 and Stage
3 (Columns 1 and 2). By contrast, being randomly paired with a lower ability worker
has no impact on the performance of higher ability workers (Columns 3 and 4). In our
2-person experiment, the less able increase their performance toward the more able
while the more able suffer no negative peer effect by being paired with a less able
person. The positive peer/reference group effect has, however, a modest effect on the
estimated coefficient on equal sharing for lower ability workers, which falls from 4.367
in Table 1 to 4.063 in Table 7 and from 3.410 in Table 5 to 2.995 in Table 7. It does,
however, reduce the precision of the estimated equal sharing effect. Thus, peer effects
as well as guilt aversion appear to underly the impact of equal sharing on the
performance of the less able workers in a two-person team.

6. Conclusion
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We stipulate that under our experimental protocols, equal sharing raises team
output by inducing greater output from lower ability workers due to guilt aversion with
some persistence over time, whereas equal sharing had no noticeable effect on the
output of more able persons. To what extent, if at all, are our findings likely to apply to
larger teams, different experimental situations, and ultimately to teams in real
workplaces?
The simplicity of our experimental design has strengths in generalizing to more
complicated situations. The Stage 1 random assignment of compensation systems
identifies the “pure effect” of those systems on behavior. The random formation of
teams sidesteps the endogeneity of team formation. The ease of learning the sliding bar
task guarantees that participants understand the task and can gauge the relative ability
of team members, which underlies guilt aversion incentives. The use of thresholds to
create team incentives avoids tying the experiment to any specific technological or
organizational mode of forming teams. Finally, allowing workers to change the mode
of compensation in Stage 3 and recording their chats about changing gave insight into
participants’ thinking about cooperation, particularly under threshold conditions, that
are likely to arise in any such change scenario.
Still, experiments that go beyond our design could produce results that would
vary from what we obtained and offer more nuanced guidance to when equal sharing,
winner-takes-all, piece rate pay or variants thereof might incentivize low or high ability
workers. One important factor that may affect results is the number of persons on a
team: greater numbers are likely to strengthen the incentive to free ride compared to
guilt aversion and thus weaken our result. Another factor that merits attention is the
complexity of tasks that face a team, where the key determinant of output may be
getting workers to accept tasks for which they have comparative advantage. In these
situations, the experimenter will likely have acted more as a manager or team leader
following more complicated instructions than in our experiment. Another factor that
our experiment short-changed is the length of time the team works together, per studies
that experimented with some persons who knew each other, presumably before the
experiment.
In sum, the simplicity of our design has both positives and negatives for
generalizing the results. The broadest implication for further research on teams and for
managements choosing forms of compensation for teams is to be attentive to the
17

performance of lower ability persons, whose responsiveness to sharing in rewards can
be critical in team performance.
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Figure 1: Experiment Design Flow Chart

Note: This flow chart is the same for either the Threshold or the No Threshold condition. Participants
remain under the same condition (either Threshold or No Threshold) for Stage 1 and Stage 3.
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Figure 2: Average Productivity of Teams in Stage 1 Threshold vs. No Threshold
95
88.7

Team Output

90

86.6
83

85

81.6
78.1

76.6
80
75
70
65
No threshold

Threshold

Equal (n=17, 25 groups)

Piece-rate (n=17, 25 groups)

Winner-Takes-All (n=15, 25 groups)
Note: For each distribution scheme, the two numbers of groups in parentheses indicate the number of
teams under No Threshold and Threshold conditions respectively.
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VARIABLES

Table 1: Determinants of Output in Stage 1 Task
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
All
All
Lower ability Higher ability

Benchmark stage output
Equal_stage1
Piece-rate_stage1
(Winner-Take-All_stage1)

0.726***
(0.055)
2.469**
(1.019)
1.630
(1.044)
-

0.729***
(0.056)
2.477**
(1.019)
1.639
(1.040)
-

0.638***
(0.106)
4.367**
(1.766)
2.105
(1.802)
-

0.815***
(0.065)
0.610
(1.077)
1.251
(0.938)
-

12.070***
(2.341)

0.490
(0.838)
11.641***
(2.476)

0.661
(1.518)
13.403***
(4.320)

0.220
(0.854)
9.106***
(2.893)

248
0.593

248
0.593

122
0.419

126
0.639

Threshold
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note: The omitted category is Winner-Takes-All (in Stage 1). Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lower ability and high ability refer to the lower
ability and more able participant within the team according to their relative output in the benchmark
stage.
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Table 2.
Team’s Stage 2 Incentive Scheme Choice Based on Stage 1 Assignment

Team choice

Panel A: Choices of All Subjects
Stage 2:
Stage 2:
Equal
Piece-Rate

Randomly
Stage 1: Equal

15 (36%)

27 (64%)

Stage 2:
Winner-TakesAll
0 (0%)

Stage 1: Piece Rate

6 (14%)

36 (86%)

0 (0%)

Stage 1:
Winner-Takes-All
Total Teams

13 (32.5%)

25 (62.5%)

2 (2%)

34 (27%)

88 (71%)

2 (2%)

Panel B: Choices of Subjects in No-Threshold Condition
Team choice

Stage 2:
Equal

Stage 2:
Piece-Rate

Randomly
Stage 1: Equal

3 (18%)

14 (82%)

Stage 2:
Winner-TakesAll
0

Stage 1: Piece Rate

1 (6%)

16 (94%)

0

Stage 1:Winner-Takes-All

4 (27%)

11 (73%)

0

8 (16%)

41 (84%)

0

Total Teams

Panel C: Choices of Subjects in Threshold Condition
Team choice

Stage 2:
Equal

Stage 2:
Piece-Rate

Randomly
Stage 1: Equal

12 (48%)

13 (52%)

Stage 2:
Winner-TakesAll
0

Stage 1: Piece Rate

5 (20%)

20 (80%)

0

Stage 1: Winner-Takes-All

9 (36%)

14 (56%)

2 (8%)

26 (35%)

47 (63%)

2 (3%)

Total Teams
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Table 3: Determinants of Choosing Equal Sharing in Stage 2
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable =1 if choose equal distribution
Equal_Stage 1
Piece-Rate_Stage 1
(Winner-takes-all_Stage1)
Lower-Ability
Male
Threshold

-0.046
(0.106)
-0.180*
(0.098)
-

-0.046
(0.102)
-0.154
(0.096)

-0.057
(0.100)
-0.171
(0.106)
-

0.029**
(0.015)
0.044
(0.053)
0.211***
(0.078)

0.028*
(0.015)
0.062
(0.053)
0.130
(0.080)
0.332***
(0.121)

0.193**
(0.092)

0.163*
(0.092)

0.029*
(0.015)
0.071
(0.052)
0.123
(0.078)
0.386***
(0.128)
0.005
(0.092)
0.045
(0.124)
-0.189
(0.152)
0.174*
(0.091)

226
0.088

226
0.162

226
0.177

Chat-coop
Chat-gap
Chat-scheme
Chat-fairness
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note: Observations are at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Summary of the Chatting Variables (mean)
No Threshold
(n=49 teams)
Cooperation
4%
Benchmark ability gap
31%
Originally randomly assigned scheme
14%
Fairness
8%
Chat Concept

Threshold
(n=75 teams)
27%
36%
13%
11%

Note: The table shows the proportion of the teams discussing about the corresponding item.
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Table 5: Determinants of Output in Self-selected Stage 3
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
All
Lower ability
High ability
0.635***
(0.068)
2.491**
(1.183)
0.976
(1.250)
-

0.584***
(0.111)
3.410*
(1.946)
0.291
(1.982)
-

0.696***
(0.105)
1.008
(1.086)
1.117
(1.024)
-

Threshold

1.117
(1.006)

1.290
(1.577)

1.167
(1.002)

Constant

18.039***
(3.138)

19.510***
(4.611)

15.931***
(4.716)

248
0.474

122
0.323

126
0.500

Benchmark stage output
Equal_Stage 1
Piece-rate_Stage 1
(Winner-Takes-All_Stage 1)

Observations
R-squared

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In col. 1, the robust standard error is clustered
at the group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The omitted category is winner-takes-all
in Stage 1 for variables “Equal_Stage1” and “Piece-rate_Stage1”.
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Figure 3: Individual Target Distribution in Team Production
Lower Ability
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

45% 45%
38%

40%
27%

24%

30%

38%
27% 27%

18%

20%

9%

10%

0%

0%

0%
no target

less than half
Winner-takes-all

half
Equal

more than half

Piece-rate

Higher Ability
100%
77%

80%

82%
67%

60%
40%
23%
20%

29%
18%
0% 0% 0%

0% 0%

less than half

half

5%

0%
no target

Winner-takes-all

Equal

more than half

Piece-rate

Note: We show the individual target based on their benchmark piece-rate task performance (top panel:
Lower ability; bottom panel: Higher ability). It shows the percentage of participants who either has no
target, a target less than half of the team threshold, equal to half of the team threshold, or more than half
of the team threshold.
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Table 6: The Impact of “Individual Target” on Productivity in Stage 1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Threshold only
No Threshold & Threshold
VARIABLES
Lower
Higher
Lower
Higher
0.533***
0.854***
0.528***
0.697***
Benchmark output
(0.138)
(0.080)
(0.115)
(0.126)
4.169*
0.437
4.288**
0.881
Equal_Stage 1
(2.130)
(1.283)
(1.860)
(1.081)
1.458
1.540
0.777
1.250
Piece-Rate_Stage 1
(2.336)
(1.092)
(1.978)
(1.081)
4.868**
-1.915
4.089**
0.373
Bigger-Than-Half
(2.113)
(1.480)
(1.869)
(1.054)
-2.077
-2.771*
-3.103*
-3.012***
Half
(1.996)
(1.421)
(1.693)
(1.074)
-5.572**
-6.291***
Less-Than-Half
(2.365)
(1.555)
(No individual target)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

17.418***
(4.375)

9.393**
(4.136)

21.707***
(4.328)

16.626***
(5.622)

65
0.465

67
0.720

113
0.369

117
0.481

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by team in parentheses for columns 1 and 2. Controlling for gender
does not change the qualitative nature of the results. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Because 18
participants are missing due to software crash for the survey part of that session, regressions with survey
information have smaller numbers of observations than those in Table 1.
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Table 7: Determinants of Output Controlling for Benchmark Peer Output

VARIABLES
Benchmark other-output
Benchmark self-output

Equal _Stage 1
Piece-rate_Stage 1
(Winner-Takes-All_Stage 1)
Threshold
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
Lower ability
Stage 1
Stage 3

(3)
(4)
Higher ability
Stage 1
Stage 3

0.204
(0.135)
0.552***

0.279*
(0.157)
0.467***

-0.013
(0.057)
0.823***

-0.048
(0.063)
0.726***

(0.101)
4.063**
(1.735)
1.918
(1.762)
0.798
(1.544)
7.336
(6.479)

(0.115)
2.995
(1.881)
0.035
(1.900)
1.476
(1.625)
11.212*
(6.743)

(0.073)
0.607
(1.080)
1.263
(0.951)
0.191
(0.855)
9.186***
(2.924)

(0.122)
0.999
(1.077)
1.161
(1.051)
1.057
(0.989)
16.234***
(4.547)

122
0.437

122
0.355

126
0.640

126
0.503

Note: “Benchmark self-output” and “Benchmark other-output” refer to the own output and the output of
the team partner in the benchmark stage, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Distributions (equal, piece-rate) are randomly assigned distribution in Stage 1.
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Appendix A: Instructions
Instructions below are based on the No Threshold condition. Additional information pertaining
to the Threshold condition are in italics. Words in brackets [] serve as clarification for readers,
and are not part of the participants’ instructions.
English translation of instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment! You have earned 10 RMB show-up fee for showing
up on-time; your other earnings in today’s session will be determined by your decisions (i.e.,
experimental earnings). Your total earnings today will be the sum of the show-up fee and your
experimental earnings. Therefore, please read the instructions below carefully! Please keep silent
and do not peek at others’ screens. Please avoid kicking the wires below the tables! We reserve the
right to ask a participant to leave without being paid for breaking these rules.
All of your decisions will be anonymous. Participants will not receive any identifying information
about others either during or after this session.
You will participate in three experiments: Experiment I, II and III. These experiments are
independent from each other. That is, your earnings in one experiment will not affect your earnings
in the other experiments.
Your earnings from the three experiments will be added to your 10 RMB show-up fee. At the end
of today’s session, you will receive your total payment.
If you have questions now or at any point during the experiments, please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to answer your questions privately.

Below are the instructions for Experiment I.
Experiment I
[Benchmark Stage in main text]:
In this experiment, you will be asked to drag a slider bar to earn money. The slider bar starts on the
left at the “0” position, and ends on the right at the “100” position. Your task is to move the slider
bar to exactly the middle, to the “50” position. The number to the right side of the slider shows the
exact position of the bar.
For each slider bar that moves to exactly the “50” position, you score 1 point.
In today’s experiments, 1 point earns 0.3 RMB; every 10 points earns 3 RMB.
1 point =0.3RMB
You have 4 minutes (240 seconds) to move as many slider bars as possible to position 50.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you.
Instruction for Experiment II will be distributed after Experiment I; Experiment III’s instruction will
be distributed after Experiment II.
If you are done with Experiment I, please lift up your head and raise your hand to let the
experimenters know.

31

Experiment II
[Stage 1 in main text]
Your decisions in Experiment II will not influence your earnings Experiment I. Your earnings from
Experiment I, II and the show up fee will be combined to equal your total earnings.
In this experiment, you and one other participant will be randomly assigned into a team. Each team
will then be randomly assigned into one of three distribution schemes:
Scheme 1: Equal sharing
Scheme 2: Piece-rate
Scheme 3: Winner-takes-all
That is, in this experiment, about a third of the teams will be assigned to the same distribution
scheme as yours, while two thirds of the teams will be assigned to the other two schemes.
The differences between the three distribution schemes are:
Scheme 1: Equal sharing
Each of your scores will be equal to the half of the total points earned by your team.
Scheme 2: Piece-rate
Your score is based on the points you earned.
Scheme 3: Winner-takes-all
The member of your team who moved the most slider bars to the “50” position earns all the points
your team has collectively scored; the member who moved the fewest slider bars to the “50” position
earns zero points. If you and the other member move the same number of sliders bars to position
“50”, the computer will randomly assign one of you to earn all the points; the other will earn zero
points.
[Information in italics pertains only under Threshold condition]
Things in common across all three schemes are:
Only when your team has moved at least equal to or higher than the team productivity threshold
(that will be shown on your screen) will your points be allocated according to the distribution
schemes; otherwise, you will both score zero.
We use the same calculation method to calculate each group’s threshold.
You have 4 minutes (240 seconds) to move as many slider bars as possible to “50”.
If you are done with Experiment II, please lift up your head and raise your hand to let the
experimenters know.
Experiment III
[Stage 2 and Stage 3 in main text]
This is the last experiment for today’s session. In this experiment, your team member is the same as
the one in Experiment II, and s/he also knows that you are the same member as that in Experiment
II. Your earnings in this experiment will not influence your earnings in the previous two experiments.
Your earnings from this experiment will be added to your total earnings.
Similar to Experiment II, your score will be determined by the total number of sliders bars
completed. [Pertains only under Threshold condition]When the total number of slider bars your
team has moved to “50” is equal to or bigger than the team threshold (the threshold in Experiment
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III is the same as the threshold determined in Experiment II), you will have a chance to earn your
points; otherwise your team earns zero points.
[Below is the chatting and choosing, the Stage 2 in Paper]
However, in this experiment, you and your team member have a chance to discuss which distribution
scheme you want to use to share your earned points. You have three choices:
Scheme 1: Equal sharing
Each of your scores will be equal to half of the total points earned by your team.
Scheme 2: Piece-rate
Your score is based on the points you earned.
Scheme 3: Winner-takes-all
The member of your team who moved the most slider bars to the “50” position earns all the points
your team has collectively scored; the member who moved the fewest slider bars to the “50” position
earns zero points. If you and the other member move the same number of sliders bars to position
“50”, the computer will randomly assign one of you to earn all the points; the other will earn zero
points.
However, if and only if both members choose the same scheme will your choice take effect;
otherwise your distribution scheme in Experiment III stays the same as that in Experiment II.
You have up to 4 minutes to discuss with your team member which distribution scheme you prefer
(in the discussion window you can click Ctrl+ Space to switch to the language of Chinese simplified).
During your communication with each other:

1. No revealing of your identity (e.g., age, sex, major)
2. No threatening language.
[Pertains only under Threshold condition] To emphasize, you earn points based on the three
distribution schemes only if your team’s total number of slider bars moved to “50” is equal to or
bigger than the team threshold (Experiment III threshold is the same as that determined in
Experiment II); otherwise, both of you score zero.

[This Task refers to Stage 3 in paper]. You have 4 minutes (240 seconds) to move as many slider
bars as possible to “50”.

Original Chinese Version:
感谢你们参加本次实验！由于你准时出席，你已经赢得了10元出场费; 你在本实验中的其
它收入将取决于你的决策 (即决策收入)。你从本实验最终得到的报酬将是出场费和实验中
的决策收入之和。所以请你认真阅读下面的实验说明！在实验中请保持安静，不要窥探他
人屏幕，不要随意移动椅子以免踢到电源和网线！如有问题，请先举手示意而不要直接提
问，研究人员会来帮助你。对不遵守以上规则者，我们有权请其离开并不支付任何报酬。
你的所有决策都是匿名的。无论在实验前后，你都不会得到任何关于其他参与者身份的信
息。同样的，他们也不会得到任何关于你的身份信息。
你将参加三个实验：实验一，二和三。这些实验都是相互独立的,也就是说,你在任何一个实
验中的收入不会被其它实验所影响。
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你在三个实验中挣到的钱将被加总到你的10元 出场费上。在今天实验结束的时候，你将收
到你三个实验中赢得的钱的总数。
如果在实验过程中有任何问题，可以举手并等待研究人员的解答。
下面是实验一的介绍。
实验一:
在这个实验里，你可以通过拉动滑杆来挣钱。滑杆的初始值被设置在 “0”，最右侧是100. 你
的任务是把它们移动到正中间的 “50”. 在滑杆右侧将显示当前滑杆所在的数值。
每移动一个滑杆到 刚好“50”的位置, 你将赢得1分。
在今天的所有实验里，你每赢得10分可以得到3元 （每一分得到0.3元）
1 分=0.3元
你有四分钟 (240秒)的时间来将尽可能多的滑杆移动到50。
如果你有问题，可以举手并等待研究人员的解答。
实验二的说明将会在实验一结束时候发放；实验三的说明会在实验二结束时发放。
实验二实验说明：
你在这个实验中的决策将不会影响你在第一个实验中得到的报酬。你从这个任务得到的报
酬将与你从第一个实验中得到的报酬以及出场费一起计入你的总收入。
在这个实验里，你和另一名参与者被随机分到一组。每一组被随机分配到三种分配方式中。

方法一： 平均分配
方法二： 各自得分
方法三： 完成多者得总分，少者得零分。
也就是说，在这次实验中，有大约三分之一的组会和你的组分配方式相同，有三分之二的
组则被分配到另外两种分配方法中。
具体来说：这三种分配方法的区别是：
方法一：平均分配
你们两个人各自的分数都等于你们赢得总分数的一半。
方法二：各自得分
你的分数将由你自己完成的分数决定。
方法三：完成多者得总分，少者得零分
你们两个人中把更多的滑杆移动到 “50” 的那个人将赢得你们两个人的总分；完成少的那个
人将得到零分。如果两个人完成的一样多，计算机将随机指定其中一个人获得总分，另一
人则得到零分。
但这三种分配方法也有相同点，那就是：
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这三种分配方式都是基于你们组移动到 “50” 的滑杆数量之和大于或等于指定值（电脑上会
显示）才可以得分; 否则你们都只能得到零分。
[斜体字的说明只适用于有小组门槛的场次] 每组的指定值的计算方法一致。
你有四分钟 (240秒)的时间来移动滑杆到50。

如果你阅读完实验二的介绍，请抬头并举手向研究人员示意。
实验三实验说明：
这是今天这场实验的最后一个实验。在这个实验里，你的组员还是上一个实验 (实验二）中
的那个组员, 而且他（她）也知道你仍然与他（她）同组。你在这个实验中的决策将不会影
响你在前两个实验中得到的报酬。你从这个任务得到的报酬将与你从前两个实验中得到的
报酬以及出场费一起计入你的总收入。
与实验二一样，你的分数将由你和你的组员共同完成的滑杆数来决定。[斜体字的说明只适
用于有小组门槛的场次]当你们组移动到 “50” 的滑杆数量之和大于或等于指定值时（该指
定值与实验二的数量指定值一样），你们才有可能得分; 否则你们都只能得到零分。
但是，在这个实验里，你和你的组员将有机会讨论你们如何分配你们共同赢得的分数。你
们将仅有三种选择，其中包括你们在实验二中的分配方式。
方法一：平均分配
你们两个人各自的分数都等于你们赢得总分数的一半。
方法二：各自得分
你的分数将由你自己完成的分数决定。
方法三：完成多者得总分，少者得零分
你们两个人中把更多的滑杆移动到 “50” 的那个人将赢得你们两个人的总分；完成少的那个
人将得到零分。如果两个人完成的一样多，计算机将随机指定其中一个人获得总分，另一
人则得到零分。
你们可以从上述三种分配方式中选择，当且仅当你们两人都选择同一种新的分配方式，你
们的选择结果才会生效；否则你们的分配方式将和实验二相同。
[斜体字的说明只适用于有小组门槛的场次] 再次强调，这三种分配方式都是基于你们组移
动到 “50” 的滑杆数量之和大于或等于指定值（该指定值与实验二的数量指定值一样）; 否

则你们都只能得到零分。
你们将有机会和你的组员讨论你们想选择的分配方式。你们有4分钟的时间讨论，并选择你
想选择的方式（在讨论窗口中按 Ctrl+空格键切换到中文输入法）。注意在交流中:

2. 不可以暴露你的身份 (例如:年龄,性别,专业)
3. 不可以使用威胁性的语言.
你有四分钟 (240秒)的时间来移动滑杆到50。
Screenshot for real-effort task (per Gill and Prowse (2012)). The participants’ goal is to move
sliders to the middle of each bar. The first row reminds team members of the team threshold (only
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for the Threshold condition). The next two rows show the individual and the individual’s
teammate’s current output level.
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Appendix B: More Results about Stage 3
In Table B1 we investigate how individual productivity changes from Stage 1 to
Stage 3 when the team stays with the randomized distribution or switches to a new
distribution, respectively. This exploits the panel structure of the data, but given the
evidence in Table 5 that the Stage 1 random assignment affected Stage 3 outputs and
the endogeneity of the changes teams made or did not make in Stage 2, Table B1 does
not produce a clean testable explanation given the sample size, particularly in the
Threshold design.
In the No Threshold condition, teams that chose to change their distribution
scheme increased team members’ output significantly, whereas those who stayed in the
same distribution scheme showed much smaller increases in output. This would
support a conclusion that changes raised productivity and thus allowing teams to
negotiate modes of compensation among members has an economic payoff, which
suggests that a market in which team members bargain over compensation schemes
improves the performance of the firm.
For members in Threshold, however, the results show a different pattern. Only
one group, those assigned piece rate in Stage 1 show a larger gain for switchers than
for stayers – a result consistent with equal pay outscoring piece rate. But we see the
opposite pattern for the groups assigned equal in Stage 1, with switchers having a
smaller gain (3.08) than stayers (3.21), albeit a statistically insignificant difference. For
teams randomly assigned to winner-take-all, there are big gains for those that switch
(4.09) but even bigger gains for the 4 individuals that stuck with winner-take-all (5.25).
What might explain the high gains to the four winner-take-all stay individuals is that
both team members had high expectations of winning and increased their output in
expectation of outdoing each other. As we did not ask those subjects why they did not
switch nor why they increased their production so much, however, and do not have
enough cases to explore, we cannot do more with this data but point out the problems
for future research and the need for a much larger sample and probing of persons in the
winner-takes-all stay group.
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Table B1: Individual Productivity Changes Over Stages
Panel A: No Threshold
Stage 1 Equal (n=34)

Stage 3 switch (n=28)
Stage 3 stay (n= 6)

Stage 3 – Stage 1
3.46 (0.99)
1.33 (1.02)

Stage 1 Piece-Rate (n=34)

Stage 3 switch (n=2)
Stage 3 stay (n=32)

3.5 (0.5)
1.44 (0.92)

Stage 1 Winner-takes-All (n=30)

Stage 3 switch (n=30)
Stage 3 stay (n=0)
Stage 3 switch (n=26)
Stage 3 stay (n= 24)

2.6 (1.36)
N/A
Stage 3 – Stage1
3.08 (1.03)
3.21 (0.97)

Stage 3 switch (n=10)
Stage 3 stay (n=40)

3.6 (1.88)
2.9 (0.665)

Panel B: Threshold
Stage 1 Equal (n=50)
Stage 1 Piece-Rate (n=50)
Stage 1 Winner-takes-All (n=50)

Stage 3 switch (n=46)
4.09 (0.82)
Stage 3 stay (n=4)
5.25 (1.97)
Note: n refers to the number of individuals accordingly. The number under “Stage 3 – Stage
1” column shows the average of the productivity change with the standard error in
parenthesis. The p-value shows the two-sided t-test on whether the mean is statistically
different from zero.
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Appendix C:
Guilt-aversion Analysis of Why Less Productive Workers Raised Output in TeamBased Production

We examine the implications of guilt-aversion behavior for the effort of
lower/higher ability participants in a two-person team. We assume that participants seek
to maximize a utility function in which earnings enter positively while effort enters
negatively; and where they suffer disutility from guilt aversion of letting down their
team. Let 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 and 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 represent the performance/effort 25 of the lower and higher ability
persons in Stage 1. Let 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 and 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 represent their ex-ante beliefs of the probability

that they will outperform their partner in this stage. We assume that 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 ∈

[0, 0.5) and 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 ∈ (0.5,1] are constant and determined by their within-team relative
abilities in the benchmark stage, which are common information for both members that
they learn at the beginning of Stage 1. 26
Then the lower or higher ability’s expected earnings are:

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 +𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻
2

under equal

sharing; 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 or 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 under piece-rate, and 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 . (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 + 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) or 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 . (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 + 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) under winner𝑐𝑐

takes-all. We represent the cost of effort with a quadratic cost function 𝑒𝑒 2 , where 𝑒𝑒 =
2

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 or 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 captures the effort level and 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 or 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 captures the cost for the lower and
higher abilities, respectively.

The heart of the model is the guilt aversion disutility when the team member
believes that they let down the other person per the social norm argued by Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006): “one central idea [in the literature on social norms] is to view a
social norm as a moral expectation, which people are inclined to live up to, (for
which) … guilt aversion can provide a ...kind of micro foundation.” Put simply, the
norm determines A’s expectation, which B seeks to live up to because B would feel
guilty if he did not.” We assume that the norm is for earnings proportionate to one's
share of the team output, per Piece-rate. Thus, we let 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 and 𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 represent

what the higher and lower ability team members think they should deserve to earn. The

earnings an individual receives in equal and winner-takes-all are based on the
25

Here we consider (expected) performance as a linear function of effort and do not distinguish between
performance and effort.
26
Although the actual outperforming probability may be affected by efforts, it largely centers on
commonly-known relative abilities. Thus, to simplify our analysis below and to focus on discussions of
guilt aversion, we assume constant ex ante belief of the outperforming probability.
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distribution schemes, own output, and the output of the other team member. An
individual would feel guilty when the team member’s actual earnings are less than what
this member deserves but would not feel guilty when the team member receives more
than or equal to this deserved amount.
Lower Ability’s Guilt Aversion
Let 𝜃𝜃 (𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 for the lower ability person and 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 for the higher ability person)

captures an individual’s guilt aversion preference, with ≥ 0 . Based on the distance
between the high ability’s earnings and the earnings they deserve, the lower ability’s
𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿

guilt aversion is 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (
under winner-takes-all.

2

, 0 ) under equal, 0 under piece-rate, and 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻

Intuitively, the lower ability believes that the higher ability

expects to receive 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 . In equal, the higher ability receives
the two is

𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿
2

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 +𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻
2

, thus the gap between

. If the performance of the lower ability improved from the benchmark

stage to exceed that of the higher ability ( 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 > 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 in Stage 1), guilt aversion would be
𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿

0. Taking together, we have 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (

2

, 0).

Since in piece-rate, each person earns what they contributed to the team output,

the lower ability’s guilt aversion is zero toward the higher ability person: 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ∗ (𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −

𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) = 0. In winner-takes-all, the higher ability persons get (𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 + 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 ) if they win the

tournament, which exceeds 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 , and 0 when they lose, which is lower than 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 . Thus, in
winner-takes-all the lower ability’s guilt aversion is 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 .
High ability’s Guilt Aversion

If the higher ability persons believe they will continue to perform ahead of their
lower ability counterparts, they will not have any guilt under equal. In general, guilt
aversion would be 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 −𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻
2

, 0� in equal. Only when 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 exceeds 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 in equal

will they experience any guilt aversion. The higher ability will not experience any guilt

aversion in piece-rate. In winner-takes-all, their guilt aversion would be the difference
between what the lower ability deserves to receive (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 ) and what the lower ability
actually receives; taking together, the higher ability’s guilt aversion is 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 .
The Utility Function

Taking all three parts together, the lower ability would maximize
𝑈𝑈(𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 , 𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 , 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ) and the higher ability would maximize 𝑈𝑈(𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 , 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 , 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 ) with optimal
effort levels as shown in appendix Tables C1 and C2.
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Table C1: Utility Function in No Threshold
Lower Ability
𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 +𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿

Equal

−

2

𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿

𝑒𝑒 2
2 𝐿𝐿

Higher Ability

𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿

− 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ∗ max(

2

, 0)

𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 2
𝑒𝑒
2 𝐿𝐿
𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿
𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 ∗ (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 + 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) − 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿2 − 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻
2

Piece-rate
Winner-takes-all

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 −

𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 +𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿
2

−

𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻
2

𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 −𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻

𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻2 − 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 ∗ max(

2

, 0)

𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 2
𝑒𝑒
2 𝐻𝐻
𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 ∗ (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 + 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) − 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻2 − 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 . 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿
2
𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 −

Table C2: Optimal Effort Level in No Threshold 27
Lower Ability

Higher Ability

𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 )

1 + 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0 )
2𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻
1
𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻

1 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 (1 −
2𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿
1
𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿

Equal
Piece-rate

𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0
𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿

Winner-takes-all

𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻0
𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻

This framework has predictions for the rank of the lower ability’s effort levels
in three distribution schemes:
-

When 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 =

When 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 >

1

, equal = piece-rate > winner-takes-all.

1

, equal > piece-rate > winner-takes-all.

1−𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0

1−𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0

When 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ∈ [0,

1

0 ), equal < piece-rate; if 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 >

1−𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿

0.5), equal > winner-takes-all.

2𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 −1
1−𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0

(it holds because 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 <

In sum, equal > winner-takes-all for all 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0, i.e., all degrees of the lower

ability’s guilt aversion preference; whereas equal > piece-rate iff 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 >

1

1−𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0

, i.e., when

lower ability’s guilt aversion preference is stronger than a cutoff parameter. 28
Threshold Condition

Under the extreme case of 𝑝𝑝0𝐿𝐿 = 0 and 𝑝𝑝0𝐻𝐻 = 1, i.e., the lower (or higher) ability believes that he/she
has a probability of zero (or one) to outperform the teammate, the optimal effort of the lower ability
1+𝜃𝜃
under equal and winner-takes-all would be 2𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 and 0 respectively, whereas that of the higher ability
27

1

would be 2𝑐𝑐 and
𝐻𝐻

1
𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻

respectively.

𝐿𝐿

The cutoff equals one under the extreme case of 𝑝𝑝0𝐿𝐿 = 0, and increases with 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0 . The intuition is
that the larger the belief of the lower ability that he/she can outperform the higher ability, the smaller the
likelihood that he/she will feel guilty under equal, thus the stronger the guilt aversion preference is
required for him/her to exert more efforts than under piece-rate.
41
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The Threshold condition shares the main features of the No Threshold condition
with a kink at the team threshold, which produces higher or lower income depending
on whether the group did or did not exceed the threshold. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 represent the

probability of reaching the threshold. It will be a function determined by the effort level
of the two team members, as 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ) . The new earnings part would involve a

multiplication with 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 (𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 ). The cost part remains the same as in No Threshold
condition.

Guilt Aversion
The guilt aversion would depend on whether the team reaches the threshold.
When they have reached the threshold, the part of disutility from guilt is as in No
Threshold. When they fail to reach the threshold, the size of guilt aversion could depend
on how much individuals believe they are responsible for this failure. We use 𝛾𝛾 to

capture it, with 0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 1. When 𝛾𝛾 = 0, individuals do not think they are responsible
for the failure and thus do not feel guilt. Contrarily, when 𝛾𝛾 = 1, individuals believe

that they are fully responsible for the failure, and they would suffer from guilt toward
their partner. In this case, guilt aversion for a lower ability would be 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 , while that
for the higher ability would be 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 . Taking together, we predict:

a. Lower and higher abilities’ effort increase with 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 or 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻 , to the extent they think

they are responsible for the failure of reaching the threshold.

b. Lower and higher abilities’ effort increase with 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 or 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 , to the extent they feel

guilty when their counterparts receive less than what they deserve.
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Appendix D: Motivations of Distribution Choices from Chat Messages in Stage 2
Table D1: Overview of Motivations of Distribution Choices from Chat Messages
Frequency
(# of teams)
With
Total
Threshold
24
18 (75%)
11
10 (90%)
10
9 (90%)
8
7 (88%)
6
3 (50%)
3
3 (100%)
3
2 (67%)
2
1 (50%)
2
1 (50%)
1
1 (100%)

Motivation Categories

A. To avoid guilt feeling, the lower ability participant proposes PR or states he/she would work harder should EQ be chosen.
B. The higher ability teaches the task hints (mostly with group threshold) and mostly advocates PR (9/11) instead of EQ (2/11).
C. The higher-ability participant would choose EQ because of altruism or cooperation consideration.
D. Driven by self-interest, the higher-ability (lower-ability) participant prefers PR (EQ).
E. Participants consider PR as fairest while EQ (WTA) unfair for the higher-ability (lower-ability).
F. Not only the lower ability but also the higher one considers EQ a powerful team incentive to spur both of their productivity.
G. The higher ability persuades the lower ability to choose PR as a safer/better choice for the latter than (the default) WTA.
H. The participants who dislike competitions would choose EQ.
I. The participants prefer the distribution scheme with the highest average team output in Stage 1 per the feedback of their session.
J. Only the higher-ability (but not the lower-ability) prefers WTA because of the higher return and the pleasure from “gamble.”
Note:
(1) EQ: Equal-sharing; PR: Piece-rate; WTA: Winner-takes-all.
(2) Our total sample includes 124 groups, with 75 of them (or 60.5%) under the Threshold condition and 49 (or 39.5%) under the No-threshold condition.
There are 48 groups whose chats evince their choice motivations for distribution schemes, whereas other group chats do not reveal direct motive information
and thus are not summarized here. Some group chats may belong to multiple motivation categories.
(3) Frequency indicates the number of teams whose chats reflect the corresponding motivation categories. We order all motivation categories by
frequency.
(4) The original detailed chat messages (in Chinese) summarized in this table are available upon request.
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